All admit that neither our thoughts nor our passions, nor ideas formed by our imagination exist without the mind. No less clear to me that the various sensations, or ideas imprinted on the senses, in any way you combine (that is, whatever the object form) can not exist except in a mind that perceives them ... I say that this table exists, that is to say, I see it and touch . If you stand outside of my office, I say the same thing, I mean only that you perceive yourself here, or some other spirit that perceives it ... Speaking of absolute existence of inanimate things, without regard to the fact that they are perceived or not is meaningless to me. Their percipi them is it is not possible to exist outside of the minds that perceive them [...]
But, you say, nothing is easier than to imagine trees in a meadow or books in a library, and none of them from receiving them. In fact, nothing is easier. But, I ask, what if you did not form in the mind certain ideas which you call books and omit or trees at the same time the idea of \u200b\u200bsomeone receiving them? You, meanwhile, do not you think? I do not deny that the mind is capable of imagining ideas deny that objects can exist outside the mind.
(Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge)
George Berkeley
REALITY 'RECEIVED AND REALITY' OUTSIDE OUR MIND
idealism, but not limited to those of recent centuries, or even the Platonic Parmenides , is the idea that sensory perception is the only foundation of our knowledge, we have no way to distinguish reality from all the stimuli it receives, and in my opinion, this argument is irrefutable. Why can not we free ourselves from the senses, we can not imagine an experience of the external universe unmediated by the conductors of the signals, and even if we could make use of new and different sense than we have, the problem does not resolve but would only traversed .
But there are parts of reality that should not cause us to close the subject with what Berkeley said in the quotation above, and directs an adequate analysis - which is outside the my attempt at starting.
First berkeley's idealism does not deny the external reality, in case denies the possibility of discerning a possible external field by ourselves from something that takes place in the mind, is proof of our lack of testing the veracity of the external universe , of a universal objectivity, but that this should not necessarily be only mental and metaphysical, and not only the objective and independent sentient. Sets limits on our ability to perceive reality, but not the limits of reality itself.
Moreover, our mind is not free from similar concerns on the outside: the process of "no confidence" assegnateci tools in the physicality, the five senses, can be extended to a regression in our mind and our awareness and essence of thinking, let me explain: I perceive by sight, the presence of a table, and I can touch and feel solidity.
This is, however, before anything else, electricity flows between the nervous system and parts of the brain responsible for processing - which are formed by the fingertips and along the lines of confluence nervous transmit data to the mind - I do not know if the table exists.
Berkeley does not allow an external world but believes in the reality of the spirit.
I am not so convinced about that because even the pensiero che io sto articolando in questa pagina è frutto di consapevolezza di un prima e un dopo del ragionamento, ma questa consapevolezza potrebbe essere solo illusoria, così come l’affidabilità dei polpastrelli o della retina. Io credo di esistere e di avere un passato, ma ciò è arbitrario potere del mio cervello – o se preferite, più correttamente, della mia mente.
Posso essere convinto di avere un passato alle spalle di consapevolezze (memoria), ma queste potrebbero del tutto essere frutto di quest’istante nel quale ne percepisco il ricordo.
In breve il passato, il mio passato che mi rende identità definita e peculiare, potrebbe non esistere, potrebbe essere un’invenzione, contemporanea a questa battitura di testo, della mia mente che però mi convince, perché non posso esistere al di là di essa, che io sono questo e voi siete qualcos’altro.
Sto parlando di considerazioni fortemente anti-intuitive e palesemente assurde, ma non smentibili argomentativamente con tanta facilità, bensì rese trascurabili dal blando “buon senso”; ma ci possiamo fidare del buon senso?
Quali sono le sue basi logiche, a parte la consuetudine?
La sfiducia nei sensi può essere inclusa nel comprendere anche una diffidenza tra la mia mente ed il mio spirito, e niente può essere considerato effettivo.
Il ricordo potrebbe essere uno strumento di apparato di potere della nostra mind, so that I might not exist now, and only in these fractions of a second that the specious present enough of psychologists, this close to me by the consciousness of being alive.
The decline in confidence is just as applicable in accordance with what is considered to be independent, to some extent, from the outside world.
logic and reason we consider them as a fact and evidence, as well as useful and amenable to feedback and the dialectic. But the basic logic follows degl'assiomi in which, taken for granted as true-false duality, credible-not credible, right-not right, we create theories that are considered erroneous or persuade.
The problem is that the logic is based, first and foremost on the sense of right and wrong, the feeling of true and false.
If someone says you're a horse, I know that this statement is incorrect. But what happens in reality is that I feel the feeling that this assumption is false, this feeling is derived by a touch of conscious and unconscious, by memories of my experience of the world, from my way of judging the claims. But this is the result of its arbitrariness and mind than any impression that I may have it in any case it is honest with themselves - myself.
How do I know that my mind always tells the truth? On what basis can I trust di componenti della mia mente quali memoria, giudizio, cognizione?
I ricordi, e perciò l’esperienza del mondo, potrebbero essere fittizia ricostruzione e sensazione che io percepisco in questo singolo istante, e improntata dalla mente per costruire l’assodato che concepisco. Ma non abbiamo la certezza della sincerità della mente, dell’affidabilità della mente, così come non ce l’abbiamo dei cinque sensi. La logica è un prodotto che la vita ci ha insegnato essere affidabile per trarre delle conclusioni e dei dati di fatto, ma potrebbe essere illusorio – e ingannevole - come tutto il resto.
Un’ultima cosa.
Anche tenendo conto di tutte queste sfiduce possibili, there are some small (?) signals that lead us to believe that reality can be existing outside of our thought and perception.
We have already said that idealism does not refute the veracity of the external universe, but only an opportunity for us to give a detailed proof and unquestionable.
So you can not believe how not to do, and we have many elements to guide with critical skills.
A scientist who deals every day, both in thought than in action (maybe the same thing) of empirical facts and material, intuitively, is taken from the view that external reality is an irrefutable fact: there is not a stone because perceive, ma perché è atomica e stabile e continuativamente osservabile, con coerenza nel tempo.
In altri termini, pur se tutto quello che sappiamo dell’esterno sono il risultato di elaborazione di elettroni che ci arrivano dai sensi, queste elaborazioni sono analoghe e congruenti nel tempo.
Alla soluzione elaborativa dell’insieme di dati elettronici che equivalgono a “matita”, questi si ripetono e non sono casuali nelle successioni dei riscontri: indi c’è coerenza, continuità e disposizione a una realtà che, non essendo disordinata e caotica nei dati pervenutici, lascia credere che anch’essa sia coerente e credibile (sempre se i ricordi sono qualcosa di realmente riconducibile ad eventi past and impromptu tricks on the mind of this).
The scientist is more susceptible to the observation that the uniformity of the signals from the senses, "a whole continuum of perceptions that make up your mind" (Hume said), is given as common as self-evident.
So there is a consistency of perceptions, the same consistency that allows us to associate with similar stimuli always the presence of a table as a chair or water. Not conclusive evidence, there can be.
the doubt remains that even if a God exists should be sure of their own omniscience and omnipotence from some entity outside his awareness of being, else he is merely disturbing the illusion of self-awareness.
thought, nobody takes him seriously, except those who consider themselves professional philosophers or thinkers. But this in no way prevents it has its apparatus of power - and that is an effect of its apparatus of power that can tell people: Do not take me seriously because I think for you, because you do a compliance standards and rules, an image, which you can obey all the more as you say.
Gilles Deleuze
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